Publication in the UK is scheduled for mid-June.
Sunday, January 23, 2011
Monday, January 17, 2011
New laser system may be another blind alley
There has been much talk in the news lately about BAE's development of a non-lethal laser system as a defence against pirate attacks (see, for example, the following).
The weapon, described by BAE as a "laser distraction system," has a maximum range of over two kilometres, and at lesser distances causes disorientation and temporary blindness.
The question is whether focused light will be any more effective than the focused sound canons (or LRADs--Long Range Acoustic Devices) that proved so laughably inadequate during the early days of Somali piracy. One advantage favouring the BAE laser system, besides its vastly superior range, is its ability to target multiple attacking vessels at once--a useful attribute, given that pirates generally attack in teams of two or more skiffs.
Unfortunately, BAE's laser cannon runs into the same problem as other active security measures: its prohibitive cost. Although BAE has described the device itself as "low cost," it is logical to assume that trained guards will still be required to operate it. Maritime shipping is one of the most competitive industries in the world, and shipowners can rarely afford to deploy security, even the roughly $10,000 per day to hire a team of unarmed guards. Nor, indeed, does the risk of a hijacking justify such an outlay; with only a fraction of one percent of commercial ships transiting the region falling victim to Somali pirate attacks, simply paying a ransom is usually a much more cost-effective strategy. Even if the laser system were provided for free, in other words, none but a select group of elite of shipping companies would be able to bear the cost of running it.
Many creative solutions have been proposed to bring an end to Somali piracy; the persistent challenge is finding a solution that conforms to the fiscal realities of the global shipping trade.
The weapon, described by BAE as a "laser distraction system," has a maximum range of over two kilometres, and at lesser distances causes disorientation and temporary blindness.
 |
| Artist's representation of the BAE laser cannon. |
The question is whether focused light will be any more effective than the focused sound canons (or LRADs--Long Range Acoustic Devices) that proved so laughably inadequate during the early days of Somali piracy. One advantage favouring the BAE laser system, besides its vastly superior range, is its ability to target multiple attacking vessels at once--a useful attribute, given that pirates generally attack in teams of two or more skiffs.
Unfortunately, BAE's laser cannon runs into the same problem as other active security measures: its prohibitive cost. Although BAE has described the device itself as "low cost," it is logical to assume that trained guards will still be required to operate it. Maritime shipping is one of the most competitive industries in the world, and shipowners can rarely afford to deploy security, even the roughly $10,000 per day to hire a team of unarmed guards. Nor, indeed, does the risk of a hijacking justify such an outlay; with only a fraction of one percent of commercial ships transiting the region falling victim to Somali pirate attacks, simply paying a ransom is usually a much more cost-effective strategy. Even if the laser system were provided for free, in other words, none but a select group of elite of shipping companies would be able to bear the cost of running it.
Many creative solutions have been proposed to bring an end to Somali piracy; the persistent challenge is finding a solution that conforms to the fiscal realities of the global shipping trade.
Monday, January 3, 2011
2010 in summary
Buoyed by a flurry of hijackings over the final months of 2010, it is hard to argue that the Somali pirates did not enjoy a great year. 2010 saw a total of 74 documented hijackings, up from 68 in 2009, and there are a record 771 known hostages currently being held by the pirates.
The following table was compiled using data from ECOTERRA, a Nairobi-based NGO:
| Number of Attacks | Hijackings | Success Rate | |
|---|---|---|---|
2008 | 134 | 50 | 37% |
2009 | 228 | 68 | 30% |
2010 | 243 | 74 | 30% |
Though the creation of the Gulf of Aden transit corridor in late 2008 produced a moderate drop in the success rate of pirate attacks, absolute numbers of hijackings continue to rise. Despite increasingly intensive international naval pressure in 2010, including a reformulated strategy by the EUNAVFOR task force, the pirates extended their attack range in every direction. The numbers say it all: the current, navally-focused approach to combatting piracy is simply not working.
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